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THE EFFECT  OF TAKEOVERS  ON  THE  EMPLOYMENT AND  WAGES 
OF CENTRAL-OFFICE  AND OTHER PERSONNEL 
ABSTRACT 
This  paper  presents evidence  based on establishment-level  Census 
Bureau  data concerning  the effects of ownership  change  on the employment 
and wages of both central—office  workers and manufacturing plant employees. 
We find that central offices that changed  owners  between 1977 and 1982 
had substantially  lower  -- about  16% lower -- employment  growth  during 
that period than central offices not changing owners.  (There  was, 
however, no significant  difference  in the growth  of R&D employment.) In 
contrast,  employment growth  in production establishments  changing  owners 
was only 5% lower than it was in production  establishments  not changing 
owners.  (The relative employment  decline in production establishments 
changing  owners occurred  in the 2 or 3 years before the takeover;  after 
the takeover,  employment  recovered  a bit, but not enough to offset the 
previous decline.)  This implies that the ratio of central-office  to 
plant employees declines  about 11% in firms  changing  owners:  about 7.2 
administrators  per 1000  plant employees  are eliminated.  These findings 
are consistent  with the view that reduction  of administrative  overhead is 
an important  motive for changes in ownership.  Failure to account for 
reductions  in central—office  employment  results in a substantial  (about 
40%) underestimate of the productivity  gains  associated  with ownership 
change.  We also  provide evidence concerning  the relationship  between 
firm size and administrative-intensity. 
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Donald Siegel 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
1050  Massachusetts Avenue 
Cambridge,  NA  02138 During  the 1980s  there has been a rapid increase in the rate of 
business ownership change  in the United  States.  The value of the cornpa- 
flies  involved in such  transactions increased  almost  sixfold between 1980 
and 1986.  The proliferation  of takeovers  has stimulated  growing interest 
(and in some cases concern)  among policymakers,  scholars,  and the public 
about the  causes  and effects of ownership  change,  particularly about its 
effects on efficiency  (hence  'competitiveness). 
One view of the process of ownership  change is that takeovers 
(actual  or threatened)  are often necessary  to force  or allow significant 
changes in management  practices,  particularly substantial  curtailment  in 
(some  of)  the firm's  activities.  Shleifer and Vishny (1988, p.11), for 
example, argue that 
hostile takeovers affect  industries  in decline or sharp change  where 
managers fail to shrink operations  rapidly enough or to make other 
adjustments.  In maintaining full-scale  operations,  managers  may be 
guarding  the domain of their control or trying to protect employees 
from dismissal  or wage cuts. 
The group of employees  that top executives  may try hardest to protect are 
their immediate  subordinates:  managers and administrators  employed  at 
corporate  or divisional  headquarters.  If so,  a change in ownership  would 
have a much greater impact  on these  employees than it would have on those 
lower down in the corporate  hierarchy. 
Prominent corporate  "raiders"  claim that this is indeed  the case. 
Henry Kravis (1989, p. 71) makes the following  statements  concerning 
leveraged  buyouts: 
People  who produce things  will stay.  We look  at the people  who 
report  to people who report  to people.  We'll often cut fat at the 
corporate level.  There'd  be much less of this... if chief  executives 
felt  the pressure from their directors  to do the cutting that they 
only do when they're threatened  by takeover. In  a  similar  vein,  Carl Icahn (1989) asserts that we have 
created  a corporate  welfare  state.  . . . companies  are  burdened  by 
layers  of  vice  presidents  who  not only don't produce,  hut are often 
counterproductive.  .. .1  and other 'raiders"  usually  eliminate the 
people  who are most responsible  for the mess —- the  "Top  Brass".. 
In 1986,  1 took control  of T.W.A.  .. .and managed to eliminate  more 
than $300 million a year in waste and bureaucracy. 
This kind of "restructuring"  can occur in the absence of a major 
shock to the organization,  such as a takeover  or bankruptcy.  General 
Electric and Monsanto  provide two recent  examples of this: 
[The chief executive  of General  Electric turned] GE from a textbook 
case of a massive, bureaucratically  managed conglomerate  into  a new 
model of decentralised,  liberated  management.  .. .He  has dispensed 
with layers  of headquarters  staff,  cutting it from 1700 to 1000 by 
removing the administrators  that 
acted 
as filters  between each 
business unit and  the bose's  office. 
Monsanto's main orgamiaational  change in its factories  has been to 
do away with most of its foreman,  supervisors,  and quality inapec 
tors and instead to invite  plant workers to oversee  themselves... 
Another useful change  has been to give  workers contact  with their 
customers,  so that they know where the product goes and wy... 
Previously,  they  would have gone through the sales staff. 
Although these  specific reductions in adminiatrative  overhead occurred in 
the absence of takeovers,  we hypothesize that in general such reductions 
are much more  likely to occur in firms experiencing changes in corporate 
control  than in other firms. 
In this paper we test this and other hypotheses by providing esti- 
mates  of the effects of takeovers on the employment  and wages of employ- 
ees in both auxiliary  establishments  (which  include central 
administrative  offices) and production  establishments. These estimates 
are obtained  via econometric  analysis  of large  longitudinal  data sets 
1  The Economist (1989,  p. 55). 
2  Ibid,  p. 56. based on Census  Bureau  surveys or censuses of both types  of estabiisn- 
ments.  For each type of establishment,  we estimate  differences  between 
establishments  changing  and not changing owners  in the growth  of 
employment  and wages, so we can contrast the effects of takeovers  on 
auxiliary-  and production-establishment  employees.  We can also identify 
the effects on a small  but important subset  of personnel -- employees 
engaged in research  and development (R&D)  -- and distinguish  between the 
effects on production  and nonproduction  workers in productson 
establishments. 
There is a small  previous literature  on the labor  impact  of owner- 
ship change,  but no previous studies have examined administrative  employ- 
ment separately.  In Section II we briefly review  the existing  evidence 
In Section  III we describe the nature of our data and provide some 
background  and historical information  about auxiliary-establishment 
employment  and wages.  The core of our empirical  investigation  is con- 
tained in Section  IV.  There  we provide descriptive  statistics,  a discus- 
sion of methodological  issues, and presentation and interpretation  of our 
econometric  estimates.  In Section V we consider  theory and evidence 
concerning  the relationship  between firm size and administrative-intensity 
(the fraction of employees  engaged in administration). A summary  and 
conclusions  appear in Section  VI. 
II.  Previous research  on the labor impact of  ownership  chang 
We are aware of three  previous studies  -- all of which examined 
firm-  or plant-level  data -- that provided evidence concerning  the labor 
impact  of ownership change.  The first  was our 1987 paper on productivity 
and changes  in ownership of manufacturing  plants, which analyzed longitu- 
dinal Census data  for almost 20,000  establishments. Although the effect 4 
of ownership  change  on total-factor productivity  (TFP)  waa  the  primary 
emphasis  of the atudy, we also  presented estimates of differences  in the 
growth  of total labor input,  during  each of the years t7  to t+7, 
between plants changing  owners in year t  ("changers")  and plants in the 
same industry  not changing  owners in year t  ("nonchangers").  The data 
indicated  that 'changers"  had significantly  lower labor  input growth 
rates  than "nonchangers"in years t-2,  t-1,  and t -- the  respective 
differences  were —0.8, 2,2, and —4,1 percentage  points  but slightly 
higher  growth rates  in years t+l,  t+2,  and t+3 (0.4,  1.0, and 0.6 per 
centage  pointa) .  about 2½ years before to 2½ years  after the 
ownership  change,  mean labor input of 'changers"  declines  5.1 percent 
relative to that of "nonchangers."  But the decline occurs largely if not 
entirely  before the change  in ownership;  after the change,  there is a 
relatiwe increase in labor  input,  although too small  an increase to 
completely  offset  the previous decline. 
Our previous paper did not contain any evidence  about the behavior 
of wages or compensation  (wages plus supplements)  in connection  with 
ownership change,  nor did it distinguish  between production  and 
nonproduction  employees.  Moreover, the analysis was based only on data 
for manufacturing (production)  establishments;  central administrative 
offices, which in 1982 accounted  for 10.0  percent of manufacturing 
payrolls, were not included.  If the effects of ownership  change on 
3  Total labor input  was defined as "production-worker—equivalent 
manhours,"  i.e.  as production-worker  manhours times the ratio of 
total wages and salaries to production-worker  wages. 
4  Almost  all of these differences  were due to differences  in employ- 
ment growth,  rather  than differences  in growth  of average annual 
hours of work. employment  in production  establishments  and in administrative  offices 
differ substantially,  then failure to account for administrative  offices 
may result in seriously  biased estimates  of the effects  on TFP.  In this 
paper we estimate the effects of ownership change  on employment  and wages 
iC administrative  offices and contrast them  with the corresponding 
effects in production  establishments. This comparison  is of interest in 
its own right,  and it also enables us to assess  and eliminate  the bias to 
which our earlier  productivity estimates  were subject.  We also 
re-examine  the labor impact  of ownership change  in production  establish- 
ments in greater detail 
The second  study that  provides evidence  on the labor  impact  of 
changes in ownership  is Kaplan's (1988) analysis of a sample  of 33 large 
(over $50 million) management  buyouts of public companies  completed 
between 1980 and  1986.  Kaplan compared the number  of employees at the 
end of the first  full post-buyout  year in which employment  numbers were 
reported  with the number  of employees in the year before the buyout.5  He 
found that the median employment  change for all 33 firms was 00%, but 
the median  employment change  was -15.3%,  i.e.  employ- 
ment growth  among  buyout firms  was 15.3  percentage  points below growth 
among aon-buyaut firms  in the  same industry-  When he restricted  the 
analysis to 22 firms  not engaged in extensive  post-buyout  acquisition  and 
divestiture  activity,  the raw and industry—adjusted  median employment 
changes were 3.3% and -11.4%,  respectively.  Thus Kaplan's  much smaller 
and more narrowly—focused  data set revealed  declines in relative employ— 
S  Kaplan did not have access to wage data. 6 
ment about 2 to  3 times greater than ours did,  and over a narrower "event 
window" 
The third  study of ownership  change,  by Brown  and Medoff (1988),  is 
the only one whose  principal focus  is on its effects on labor,  and is the 
ooiy one to provide estimates  of wage effects.  These authors  analyzed 
quarterly employment  and payroll data contained in unemployment  insurance 
records kept  by the Michigan Employment  Security Commission.  As they 
acknowledge, an important  disadvantage  of this data set is that it covers 
only a single state.  Consequently,  the data do noi reflect  what is 
happening in othar  locations  of multistate companies,  and  few large 
acquisitions are  recorded  in their data.  Brown  and  Medoff  distinguished 
three kinds of ownership  change:  (1)  "simple  sales":  firm A changes 
ownership  without being integrated  with any other firm;  (2) "assets-only 
sale":  firm A purchases  the assets  of firm B without absorbing its 
workforce; and  (3) "merger":  firm  A purchases firm B and (at least 
initially)  absorbs  (most  of) firm B's workers, or firm A and firm B 
combine to form firm C, with (at least initially)  firm C including (most 
of) the workers of firms  A and B.  Their  estimates of the employment  and 
wage changes associated  with each type of transaction  are as follows: 
employment  wage 
change  change 
simple sale  +9%  —5% 
assets-only sale  -5%  +5% 
merger  +2%  -4% 
Farber (1988) observed that the fact that transactions  were classified  on 
the basis of employment  changes  makes it difficult to interpret  the 
employment  effects, and the authors themselves  acknowledge  that the 
estimates of these  effects are sensitive  to specification  details; the 
wage effects were less ambiguous.  Because only about 1/3 of these 7 
transactions were assets-only  sales,  their estimates  imply that on 
average wages fall slightly -— about  I or 2 percent -— in connection  with 
ownership change.  They observe that in the case of mergers, the wage 
decline may partly  be due to the departure  of the  relatively  highly-paid 
head of the acquired firm. 
Auerbach (1988, p. 2) suggested  that  perhaps the most important 
conclusion  that can be drawn from the Brown and Medoff study is that the 
employment  and wage changes  associated  with ownership  change  are of 
"relatively  small  magnitude."  But even if the effect  of ownership  change 
on overall employment  and wage rates  is small,  it may have a sizeable 
impact  on the employment  and wage of specific  types of workers.  Our data 
enable us to determine  the effects  of ownership change  on a relatively 
small,  but key,  subset  of employees:  those who work in auxiliary  estab- 
lishments -- the  locus  of employment  for many top managers, administra- 
tors,  and R&D personnel. 
III.  Data and descriptive  statistics 
The empirical analysis  described in this paper is based on three 
distinct data sets,  each based on a different Census  Bureau census  or 
survey  of establishments  or firms.  The first data set is based on 
"Auxiliary  Establishment  Reports" collected  in the course  of the  1977  and 
1982 Economic Censuses.  Researchers  have not, to our knowledge,  previ- 
ously analyzed these data at the micro level.  The Census  Bureau defines 
auxiliary establishments  as those 
whose employees  are primarily engaged in general  and tusiness 
administration;  management;  research, development,  and testing; 
warehousing; electronic  data  processing; and other supporting 
services performed centrally  for other establishments  of the S 
same c1pany 
rather  than for other companies or the general 
-  public. 
The  primary functions of  these  eatabliahments  are to manage, 
administer,  service or  suppo the activities of the other 
establishments  of the  company 
The Census  of auxiliary establishments  collects data  on  the  number  of 
employees,  by type of work performed, annual  payroll, depreciable  assets, 
capital  expenditures,  and other  variables  and attributes  of the estab- 
lishment.  in 1982,  there  were almost  36,000 auxiliary establishments, 
and almost  2.6 million people were employed in them.  Table  1  shows the 
1982  distribution  of auxiliary  establishment  employees  by  type of work 
performed.  About one—third of  employees are classified  as  "administra- 
tive  and managerial."8  The principal activity  of 9.3 percent (240 
thousand)  of these employees  was research,  development,  and testing.9 
We obtained  data for the entire  set of auxiliary  establishments  in 
each of two adjacent Census  years —— 1977  and  1982  —- and  when  records 
for  a given  establishment (identified  by a unique  establishment  code) 
were present in both years,  we linked  them togetber.0  Each record  also 
contains a  code identifying the parent company that owns the establish- 
6  U.S.  Bureau of the Census (1986,  p. A-I). 
7  U.S. Bureau of the Census  (1986,  p.  2). 
8  In  contrast,  according  to  the Current Population  Survey,  about 11 
percent of all nonfarm employed  persons identify themselves  as 
managers and administrators.  See  U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(1980,  p. 34). 
9  The National Science Foundation,  on the basis of its annual survey 
of industrial  R&D, estimates that there  were 510 thousand 
full-time-equivalent  scientists  and engineers  engaged in R&D in 
industry  in 1982. 
10  As discussed  below,  a substantial  fraction of the establishments 
that were ever observed were  observed in only one year, presumably 
due to closing  and opening of establishments.  Since 1982 was  a very 
severe recession  year,  our sample  period  is probably not representa- 
tive of the entire recent  postwar  era. merit.  We assumed that the establishments owner changed if and only if 
there  was a change in the value of this  code  between 1977 and 1982.  This 
procedure  is probably subject to both type I and type II error:  some 
non-matches  of the code  may be due to coding  errors, and certain owner- 
ship changes may not result in changes in the code.  Measurement  error 
contained  in our indicator of ownership change  is likely  to bias towards 
zero the estimated differences  in behavior between establishments  chang- 
ing and not changing owners.  Unfortunately,  the data don't permit  us to 
classify  ownership changes into different  "types",  e.g.  hostile versus 
friendly  takeovers. 
The data set described  above enables  us to contrast the employment 
and wage behavior of auxiliary  establishments  changing owners  with that 
of auxiliary establishments  not changing  owners.  We also  wish to con- 
trast  the former  with the behavior of production  establishments  changing 
owners.  To accomplish  this we utilize  a second  data set,  the Longitudi- 
nal Establishment  Data (LED).  This data set,  based on the Annual Surveys 
and Censuses of Manufactures, contains  annual  data for the years 1972-81 
on the output  and inputs  of almost 20,000  manufacturing (production) 
establishments.  It was the basis for our previous (1987)  study of 
productivity  and ownership change,  and also for Lichtenberg's (1988) 
study  of internal  costs of adjustment,  and is described in detail  in 
those  two papers. 
Table  2 presents data on the aggregate  employment  and payroll of 
both auxiliary  and production establishments  in manufacturing, for Census 
years from 1963 to 1982.  Auxiliary—establishment  employment  grew much 
more rapidly than production—establishment  employment.  The number of 
auxiliary-establishment  employees  per 100 production—establishment IC 
employees increased  from 45  in 1963 to 72  in 1982.  Payrnll  per employ 
cc is much higher in auxiliary than in production establishments,  hut the 
gap  has been  narrowing;  auxiliary establishment employees on  average 
earned 68  percent  more  in 1963,  but only 56  percent  more  in  1982. 
IV  ricaipl  sis  of the effects of take  overs 
We  begin our empirical analysis of the labor  impsct  of ownership 
change by considering the data presented in Table  3  on mean values of 
employment  and wage levels  and changes, 197782,  by status  of auxiliary 
eatsblishment.1l The  four mutually exclusive,  exhaustive statuses and 
the criteria for assigning them to auxiliary establishments were as 
follows;  (1)  "no  change";  the establishment was  present  in both 1977 
and  1982  censuses and  had the same  owner  ID;  (2)  "changed  owners";  the 
establishment  was present in both years  and had diffe6ent IDs;  (3) 
"closed':  the establishment was present in 1977  only;  (4)  "opened";  the 
establishment was present in 1982 only.  Previous studies  have documented 
the high rate of closing  and opening  of production  establishments  between 
census  years.  For example,  Dunne,  Roberts, and Samuelson (1988, Table 
Ib) estimated  that 25 to 40 percent (depending  on plant age) of the 
manufacturing  establishments  present in a given census  had closed  by the 
next census.  Table 3 indicates  that a similar "failure rate"  (36.3 
percent in manufacturing)  applies to auxiliary  establishments. Also as 
in the  case  of production  establishments,  auxiliary  establishments  that 
close are smaller on average than those that survive. 
11  Because we will want to contrast  the effects of takeovers  on auxil 
iary  establishments  with their effects on production  establishments, 
and we lack data on nonmanufacturing  production  establishments,  we 
present estimates  for auxiliary establishments  only in manufacturing 
as well as for those  in all  industries. ii 
Despite the fact that the number of establishments  closing and 
opening is large relative  to the number of surviving  establishments,  and 
very large relative  to the number changing  owners,  in the remainder  of 
this paper  we analyze only the data on surviving  establishments. Because 
we observe establishments  that close or open only once,  we cannot compare 
their employment  or wage changes with those of surviving  plants.  One 
might hypothesize  that the probability  that an establishment  closes  is 
related to whether or not it changes  owners.  In their study of mergers 
and acquisitions  in the New Jersey economy,  however, Yago and Stevenson 
(1986)  found  no evidence  of plant closings  occurring  as a result  of 
hostile takeovers.  Also, Brown and Medoff (1988,  pp.  22-23) reported 
that including  firms  that 'died"  in their sample  did not materially 
affect their results.'2 
Among the surviving  establishments,  those that change owners  are 
smaller and pay lower wages than those that do not.  10.5 percent of all 
surviving auxiliary  establishments,  and 10.8 percent of those in manufac- 
turing,  changed  owners.  To calculate  the percent of employees affected 
by changes in ownership,  we can weight the number of establishments  by 
their respective  mean employment; in manufacturing,  the proportion of 
employees  affected is 6.5 percent.13 
Perhaps the most interesting  statistics  in Table 3 are the mean 
growth rates  (changes  in logarithms)  of employment  and wages.  Employment 
growth in auxiliary  establishments  that changed owners was  19 percent 
12  See Lichtenberg  and Siegel (1987,  pp 661—2) for a discussion in a 
slightly different context  of the effect of censoring  failing 
establishments. 
13  Brown and Medoff found that 16 percent of all workers sampled were 
involved in a change in ownership  over a five-year  period. 12 
lower (16 percent in the case of manufacturing  establishments)  than it 
was  in establishments  that didnt change  owners,  Moreover  the latter 
experienced  modest  positive growth  whereas the former  experienced  sharp 
declines in employment.  Establishments  changing  owners  also had lower 
growth  rates of nominal  wages, although  only in the case  of manufacturing 
establishments  is the difference  nonnegligible —  4.4  percentage 
14 
points. 
The differences  between growth  rates  are interesting  and suggestive, 
but for at least  two reasons  one might believe that the simple  differ- 
ences are biased estimates  of the true effects of ownership  change. 
First, the data analyzed in Table 3 were not standardized  by industry. 
If the incidence  of ownership  change is greater in industries  with above- 
or below-average  employment  growth,  then differences  between  / 
unstsndardized growth  rates  may prnvide a distorted  picture of the impact 
of ownership change  on employment.  Blair (1988)  found  that the level of 
merger activity  tends to be higher in industries  experiencing lower 
employment  growth, suggesting that  the estimates reported  above  overstate 
the industry-adjusted  differential. 
Second, it is well known that there is a strong  negative correlation 
between the initial size of firms and their subsequent  growth  rates. 
Hall (1987,  p. 603) has recently shown  that "neither  measurement  error in 
employment  nor sample attrition  can account for the negative coefficient 
on firm size in the growth  rate equation."  Since establishments  changing 
owners sre smaller than those not changing owners,  in the absence of any 
14  The change  between 1977 and 1982 in the logarithms  of the Consumer 
Price Index and of the Gil!' Implicit  Price  Deflator were .466 and 
.390,  respectively. 13 
effect  of ownership  change  on employment growth  one would expect  the 
former  to exhibit r  employment  growth.  The employment-growth  differ- 
ences shown in Table 3 would therefore  underestimate  the effect of 
ownership change. 
We can eliminate  both of the potential  biases (which  may be offset- 
ting)  by estimating  regression  models of the form 
ln  =  OC 
+  ln X15 
+  + u..  (1) 
where X denotes either employment  or wages; the subscript ijt refers to 
establishment  i  in 4-digit SIC industry  j in year t; OC equals 1 if the 
establishment  changed  owners  between t-5 and t, and otherwise  equals 
zero;  and is is a classical  disturbance.  Simply comparing  the growth 
rates  of establishments  changing  and not changing  owners is equivalent to 
imposing the restrictions  1  and y. = 1,V.  We  now relax  those 
restrictions. 
Estimates of the parameter f3 in equation (1), for auxiliary 
establishments  in both all industries  and in manufacturing,  and produc- 
tion establishments  in manufacturing,  are reported in Table 4.  Relaxing 
the restrictions  reduces slightly the estimated employment  effect  of 
changes  In ownership  of auxiliary  establishments:  the mean relative 
employment  of establishments  changing owners  declines about 16-17  per- 
cent.  In contrast,  relaxing  the restrictions  has  a substantial  impact  on 
the estimated  wage effects:  controlling for industry  and the  initial 
wage level, mean wage growth  of auxiliary establishments  changing  owners 
is 9.2 percentage  points lower (6.0 percentage  points in manufacturing) 
than that of establishments  not changing owners.  These estimates imply 
that employment  and real  wages fell significantly  more in auxiliary 14 
establishments  changing owners  between 1977 and 1982 than  in those that 
did not. 
In addition  to estimating  the effect of ownership  change  on the 
total  employment  of auxiliary  establishments,  for a subset  of establish- 
ments we can also estimate  the effect  on R&D employment,  i.e.  the number 
of persons whose principal  activity is reaearch,  development,  and test- 
ing.  As Auerbach (l988,p.  3-4) notes, some  parties to the popular and 
policy debates about takeovers  are concerned  that takeovers,  actual or 
threatened,  may reduce  investment  in long-term  projects,  particularly 
R&D.  We have estimated equation (1) -- defining X as R&D employment -- 
for  the subset  of 1099 establishments  in all industries  that reported 
positive values of this variable in  both years.15  The point estimate 
(t-statistic)  for  from this equation is —.039  (0.5): The estimate is 
less  than one-fourth  as large in magnitude as the corresponding  estimate 
for total  employment,  and it is far from statistically  significant. 
Hence we cannot reject  the null hypothesis  of no difference  between 
establishments  changing and not changing owners  in the growth  of R&D 
employment.  This finding is consistent  with that of Hall (1988), who 
"found  very little  evidence in the existing data (through  1985)  that 
acquisitions  cause  a reduction  in R&D spending;  in the aggregate,  firms 
involved in mergers showed  no difference  in their  pre and post—merger  R&D 
performance  over those not so involved." 
In order to contrast the effects of ownership change on auxiliary 
establishments  with its effects on production  establishments,  we also 
15  In the future  we also plan to compute the number  of establishments, 
by status,  going from zero R&D employment in 1977 to positive  R&D 15 
16 
estimated  equation (1) using the LED for production establishments;  the 
results are shown in the last line of Table 4.  Ownership change  is 
associated  with relative declines in employment  and wages in production 
establishments,  but the magnitudes  of the declines is only about 
one-third those for auxiliary  establishments,  The growth  rate of employ- 
ment is 4.5 percentage  points  lower for production establishments  chang- 
ing owners  between 1976 and 1981 than it is for other  production 
establishments,  controlling  for industry and initial  size.  As noted 
earlier, production  establishments  changing owners  tend to have higher 
employment growth  in the first  several years after ownership change  than 
production establishments  that have not changed  owners; the negative  net 
effect  of ownership change  on 5-year employment  growth is due to large 
-  17 
relative  employment  declines  immediately  preceeding  the  change. 
The wage effects shown in Table 4 are based on the definition  of the 
wage as payroll per employee,  i.e. supplementary labor  compensation is 
excluded.  In the case of production establishments,  we were also able to 
estimate the model for X defined as total  compensation (payroll  plus 
supplementary compensation)  per employee.  Using this more comprehensive 
wage measure changes the estimated  wage effect  (and its t-statistic) 
from -.021  (4.7)  to —.029  (7.8).  The relative decline in total compensa- 
tion per employee is 38 percent greater than the relative decline in 
payroll per employee.  Because the ratio of aggregate supplementary  labor 
employment in 1982,  and the number going from positive to zero R&D 
employment. 
16  Data limitations  forced  us to define t as  1981 rather  than 1982. 
17  Because we observe auxiliary  establishments  only twice,  we cannot 
determine for them the extent to which the decline in relative 
employment and wages occurs  before vs.  after ownership change. 16 
compensation  to aggregate  total compensation  is about .2, this implies 
that the effect of ownership  change  on supplements  per employee  is -.061, 
about three  times as great  as its effect on payroll per employee. 
The difference  between the employment  effect of ownership  change in 
auxiliary and production  establishments  has some interesting  and 
important  implications.  Let a  represent  the difference  between estab- 
lishments changing  and not changing  owners,  A represent 
auxiliary—establishment  employment,  P represent  production-establishment 
employment,  N represent  their ratio A/F, and let dot superscripts  repre- 
sent growth  rates.  Then 
= M -  = -157 - (-.045) = -.112 
so that ownership  change  reduces the ratio  of auxiliary  establishment 
employment  to production  establishment  employment  by 11.2  percent.  As 
Table I  shows,  the simple  average of the 1977 and 1982 aggregate  values 
of this ratio is (5.8 + 7.2)12 = 6.4  percent.  Evaluated at this popula- 
tion mean, the 11.2 percent reduction in N implies  the elimination  of 
about 7.2 auxiliary  establishment  jobs for every 1000  production  estab- 
lishment  jobs.  This reduction  in N is consistent  with the examples of 
"restructuring"  described  earlier in the paper. 
In our earlier study of the effects of ownership change  on 
total-factor  productivity, the measure of labor  input  we used did not 
account for auxiliary  establishment employment;  it was based only on 
production  establishment  employment.  Because ownership  change results in 
a reduction  in N, we underestimated  the true relative  decline in labor 
input,  and the true relative  increase in TFP,  that occurs in connection 17 





(1_SA)AP =P  + 
SA (MP)  =P+SAtR 
where 
SA 
is the share of auxiliary  establishment  payroll in total 
(auxiliary-  plus production-establishment)  payroll.  The mean of the 1977 
and 1982 aggregate  values of 
SA 
is equal to 9.2 percent.  Before  our 
measure of labor  input growth  was  simply  P; the error e in our measure 
was 
=  -  = SR 
= (.092)  (-.112)  -.0103. 
Since  LP = - .045, this represents  a percentage  error of about 23 percent. 
To assess the resulting  error in the estimate of the effect  of ownership 
change  on TFP growth,  we need merely to multiply c by (-1 times)  labor's 
share in gross output,  which is approximately 1/3.  Because true relative 
labor input fell 1.03 percentage  points more than we had estimated,  true 
relative TFP increased .34 percentage  points  more than we had estimated. 
We had previously estimated  that ownership change  is associated  with 
relative TFP increases  of .42 to  .51 percentage  points.18  Thus,  our 
estimate of the effect  of ownership change  on TFP is increased  about 
75 percent -- from  .46 to  .80 percentage  points 
-- when  we properly 
account  for  changes in auxiliary-establishment  employment. 
The preceding calculations  were implicitly predicated  on  the assump- 
tion that the differences  in employment  growth  between firms  involved and 
not  involved in ownership  change is identical  to the difference  between 
18  See Lichtenberg  and Siegel (1987, p. 660). 18 
establishments  involved  and not involved in ownership change.  It is 
possible,  though, that when a firm acquires  an administrative  office, it 
transfers  or reassigns  some of its employees  to offices it already 
operates.  If that  were the case,  we would have overestimated  the net 
decline in relative  administrative  employment  accompanying  ownership 
change,  in order to investigate  this possibility,  we generalized  equa- 
tion (1) to include additional  regressors,  including  a dummy variable 
equal to one if the  1982 owner of the establishment  had acquired other 
auxiliary  establishments  since 1977, and otherwise  equal to zero.  A 
positive coefficient ()  on  this  variable  would  be  consistent  with  the 
hypothesis  of  transfers  of  employees  from  acquired  establishments, 
although  it  could  also  simply  reflect  that  firms  acquiring  establishments 
are  also  otherwise  growing  more  rapidly  (e.g., by building new production 
establishments). When this variable  was included in the employment 
equation, the estimates  of  and  were as follows: 
All industries  —.180  .007 
(8.0)  (0.4) 
Manufacturing  —.192  .074 
(5.3)  (2.8) 
The coefficient  is far from significant  in the regression  estimated on 
establishments  from all industries.  In the case of manufacturing, 
however, it is positive and significantly  different from zero,  indicating 
that auxiliary  establishments  owned by firms  that have  been acquiring 
other auxiliary  establishments  experience  above-average  growth in employ- 
ment.  The magnitude of  is only 39 percent as large as the magnitude 
of ,  but  the initial size of establishments  owned by firms that have 19 
been acquiring other  establishments  is probably greater than the initial 
size of acquired establishments. 
To calculate  the extent to which reductions  in employment  in ac- 
quired  auxiliary  establishments  might  be offset  by increases  in employ- 
ment in other  auxiliary establishments  owned by the acquiring  firm,  we 
need data on (1) the proportion  it  of cases of au.xiliary-establisbment 
acquisition  in which theacquiring  firm  owns other auxiliary  establish- 
ments, and (2) the  ratio  8 of mean initial employment  of acquired  estab- 
lishments  to mean initial employment  of other establishments  owned  by 
acquiring  companies.  Our estimate of the difference Mf 
between 
auxiliary  establishment  employment  growth in firms  involved  and not 
involved in acquisitions  would  be Af 
=  +  it  8 
Unfortunately,  direct data on it  and 8 are not available at this time,  and 
we are therefore  forced to use crude proxies.  Our proxy for  it  is simply 
the proportion  of all auxiliary  establishments  (not just ones that changed 
owners)  that are owned  by firms  that own more than one auxiliary  estab- 
lishment;  this fraction is approximately  2/3.  Our proxy for 8 is the 
ratio  of mean 1977 employment for  'no change" establishments  to the mean 
for establishments  that changed owners; as shown in Table 4, this 
ratio is 156.3/93.2  = 1.68,  Hence 
A.Af 
-.192 + (.67)  (1.68)  (.074)  = 
-.109,  and our estimate  of the magnitude  of the effect of ownership 
change on relative auxiliary-establishment  employment  is reduced by about 
a third,  from -.157  (from  Table 3) to -.109.  We have not investigated 
whether employment  growth in production establishments  owned by firms 
that are acquiring  other production  establishments  is above—  or 20 
below-average,  but we assume that this is not the rase,  and therefore 
that - 045  is  a valid estimate of  bP.  Then the magnitude  of our estimates 
of tE and c is redured  by 43 percent to —  .064  and —  .0053,  respectively. 
The correction  to our previous  paper's estimate of the relative  TIP increase 
associated  with ownership  change is also proportionately  reduced,  from .31 
to .18 percentage  points.  Our admittedly  crude attempt to adjust  for 
employment  growth in nonacquired  establishments  of acquiring  firms  thus 
reduces  the size of the effects of interest,  but it does so only in 
manufacturing,  and even there the effects remain  sizeable after  adjustment. 
Up until now we have been analyzing  one kind of relative-employment 
effect  of ownership change:  its effect  on the ratio of 
auxiliary-establishment  employment  to production-establishment  employ- 
ment.  As we noted earlier,  theCensus  data enable  us to distinguish 
between  two different types  of employees in production  establishments: 
production  and nonproduction  workers.  About one—fourth  of 
production-establishment  employees  are nonproduction  workers. 
Nonproduction  workers in production  establishments (denoted  NP)  may be 
more similar  to auxiliary-establishment  employees (denoted  A),  in terms 
of the nature of their  work and their earnings (skill)  levels,  than they 
are to production  employees in production establishments  (denoted 
19  Average payroll per employee in 1982  for PP, NP, and A workers was 
16.5,  25.2,  and 29.8 thousand dollars, respectively. 21 
We  therefore  consider next the effect of ownership  change  on the ratio 
NP/PP and also on (NP + A)/PP.20 
Because we have annual  -- as  opposed to merely quinquennial  -- data 
on production  establishments,  our method of analysis  will differ slightly 
from the one developed earlier.  Our procedure is to estimate regressions 
of the form 
in X..  =  OC..  + y.  + 
ij,t+k  k  ijt  j  ij,t+k 
where X denotes either P(PP+NF),  PP, or NP; the subscript ij,t+k  denotes 
establishment  i in industry  j  in year t+k (k-5,  -4,... ,-3, +4); OC.. 
equals 1  if the establishment  changed owners  between t-l and t, and 
otherwise  equals zero;  y. is a  'fixed effect" for industry  j; and u  is a 
classical  disturbance.  Hence  is the percentage  difference  in the mean 
value of X in  year t+k between establishments  changing and not changing 
owners  between t-1 and t.  Estimates of the  are reported  in Table  5. 
The figure  -.082 in the first  row and column  indicates  that establish- 
ments that will change  owners  between four and five years later on 
average employ 8.2 percent fewer  workers than those that will not change 
owners.  As in the case of auxiliary  establishments,  the probability  of 
future  ownership  change is inversely  related to current  size.  The first 
column  clearly documents the fact noted earlier, that the relative  total 
employment  of plants changing owners  declines sharply until immediately 
after  the change,  and then increases slightly.21 
20  This analysis will not have implications for our previous measures 
of labor-input  or TFP growth,  since  these were already  based on an 
appropriately- (relative-wage-)  weighted index of PP and NP. 
21  The relative  wage -— payroll per employee —- displays  a similar 
pattern, falling from -.020 in year t-5 to -.039  in years t-1 and t, 
and then increasing slightly to -  .036. 22 
As columns  2 and 3 of Table 5 show,  the data on total  employment 
mark very different  pstterns for production  and nonproduction  employment. 
Whereas  plants changing owners  on average  employ 7-13 percent fewer 
production  workers than  plants not changing  owners  in every  year from t-5 
to t+4,  they employ 1-2 percent  more nonproduction  workers in every  year, 
and the differences  are mostly significant.  The ratio of nonproduction 
to production  employees  is 9-16 percent higher  in plants changing  owners 
Moreover, the decline in relative  employment  prior to ownership  change, 
and the partial subsequent  recovery,  is confined almost  entirely to 
production-worker  employment.  There is very little  movement over time in 
the relative  employment  of nonproduction  workers. 
In order to obtain  estimates  of the effects of ownership  change  on 
PP and NP workers that are comparable  to our estimates  of the effects on 
A workers, we compute averages of the 5 five-year  differences  - n-s. 
- 4 
—  Estimates of the effect of ownership  change  on 
five-year  relative-employment  growth,  for PP,  NP,  and A, are as follows: 
unadjusted  adjusted 
estimate  estimate 
PP  -.036 
NP  -.001 
A  —.157  —  .109 
Whereas the relative decline in A  associated  with ownership change  is 
apparently  much greater than the relative  decline in  PP,  the relative 
decline in NP is essentially  zero.  In 1982 there were 10.3  A workers and 
43.7 NP workers per 100 P workers in manufacturing, so the mean value of 
the fraction  a = A/(A+NP)  is .191.  Hence the relative decline in the sum 
SA+NP is 23 
aM  +  (1-a)NP  - .030 
which  is close  to,  indeed  slightly less  than,  the mean relative decline 
in production-worker  employment P  -  .035.  Although the ratio  of 
auxiliary-establishment  employees to production  workers declines sharply 
in connection  with ownership  change, the ratio  of total 'indirect"  labor 
(A + NP) to "direct"  labor (P) does not —— in fact,  it appears to in- 
crease  slightly  —- due to the negligible effect  of ownership  change on 
the employment  level  of nonproduction  workers in production 
establishments. 
V.  The relationship  between firm size and administrative  intensity 
Table 2 provided aggregate  time-series  data on the relationship 
between auxiliary-establishment  employment  and production-establishment 
employment.  We believe that firm—level cross-sectional  dàtacbaracterIz- 
ing this relationship  are also  of interest.  A number of economists  and 
organization  theorists  have developed theoretical  models of the hierar- 
chical  or administrative  structure  of organizations,  which have testable 
implications  for the relationship  between the number  of administrative 
employees  A and the number of production employees  P.  Starbuck (1964,  p. 
499) observes that early organization  theorists  tended to view the 
administrative  structure  as a pyramidal hierarchy.  One man comprises  the 
top level  in this  hierarchy;  be has S subordinates  who comprise the 
second level;  each of these has S subordinates,  giving  S2 people in the 
third level;  and so forth.  (S is referred  to as the "span of control.") 
The total  number of administrators  in a hierarchy  with X levels  is A = 
(5X - 1)/(S — 1).  If there are  production workers per foreman then the 24 
total number of production  workers is P = a  .  and total emploent 
is 
Al  T=A+P=—+a 
S 
Starbuck showed that,  for plausible,  assumed values of S and a, the ratio 
A/P would be essentially  independent  of T (or A) for values of T above  a 
relatively  low threshliold  (i.e., 1  100).  In other  words, increasing 
the dumber A of hierarchical  levels  of an organization  (hence its size  1) 
would generally  not result  in an increase  in the proportion  of adminis- 
trative employees.L2  Similarly,  Beckmann (1977,  p.  1) argued  that the 
claim that 'increasing  size  of the organization  burdens every  productive 
worker with an ever increasing  number of administrators  per production 
worker" was not theoretically  valid.  Previous theorists,  such as Knight 
and Kaldor, had hypothesized that there  are increasing  costs  of adminis- 
tration per worker;  in the presence of increasing  returns  to production 
activities (which  they also hypothesized),  the existence  of an optimal 
firm size required there  to be diseconomies  of administration. 
Existing evidence on the relationship  across organizations  between 
administrative-intensity  (A/P)  and size (T) is very limited.  Starbuck 
(1964,  PP. 501-2) cites four studies:  one of California  school  dis- 
tricts,  which found a positive relationship,  two of firms, which found 
essentially  no relationship,  and one of 30 organizations  of various 
22  The proportion  of administrators  could even by a decreasing  function 
of size if the span of control  S tended to be greater in larger 
organizations,  as some fragmentary  evidence indicated. 25 
kinds,  which found  a slightly  negative relationship.  We seek to shed 
further light on this relationship  by examining  the correlation  across 
firms between total firm  employment and either (a) total employment  in 
auxiliary  establishments  or (b) managerial  and administrative  employment 
in auxiliary  establishments. Data on total  firm employment  were obtained 
from a third data source,  the NSF/Census Survey  of Industrial  R&D.23 
Parent-company  identification  codes were used to aggregate auxiliary 
establishment  employment  data to the firm level and then to link them 
with the data from the R&D survey.  This yielded  a sample  of almost  2800 
firms,  which  was biased towards  large, R&D-intensive firms in 
manufacturing. 
Perhaps the most straightforward  way to examine this relationship, 
and to test the hypothesis  of increasing  costs of administration,  would 
be to regress the logarithm  of auxiliary-establishment  employment  on the 
logarithm  of total employment.  But 55 percent of the firms  in our sample 
did not have any auxiliary  establishments.24 Therefore  we decided to 
examine this relationship  nonparametrically,  by ranking  and grouping  the 
firms into 10 size classes on the basis of total employment,  and comput- 
ing the ratio of auxiliary  establishment  employment (or managerial  and 
administrative  employment  in these establishments)  to total firm employ- 
ment in each class.  We computed  both weighted ratios (i.e.,  the ratio of 
class  means) and unweighted  ratios (i.e.,  the class  mean of the ratio); 
the latter  is more sensitive  to outliers,  particularly  among the smallest 
size classes.  The results  are presented in Table 3.  The data provide 
23  See Lichtenberg (1989)  for a discussion  of these data. 
24  Only 0.4 percent of the entire 3.4 million companies recorded  in 
Census  data had at least one auxiliary  establishment. 26 
strong support for the hypothesis  that both auxiliary  establishment 
employment  as a whole, and its administrative  and managerial component, 
increase  more than proportionately  with firm size.  These findings  appear 
to be inconsistent  with the pyramidal  model of administrative  structure 
sketched  above,  We need to recognize,  however, that  because managers and 
administrators  are employed in production  establishments  as well as in 
auxiliary  establishments  about 25 percent of production establishment 
employees  are nonproduction  workers  the data in Table 3 may partly 
reflect the fact that larger firms  locate  a larger  fraction of their 
nonproduction  activities  in auxiliary  establishments.  Although it would 
be possible in principle  to control  and test for this,  we have not had 
the opportunity  to do this,  Thus it is perhaps premature to reject the 
hypothesis of nonincreasing  costs  of administration. 
VI.  Summary and  conclusions 
In this paper we have reported  analyses of three large  Census Bureau 
establishment—  or firm—level  data sets designed to yield insight into the 
effect of changes in ownership  on the employment  and wages of several 
important  categories  of workers.  We were particularly concerned  with the 
effects on workers in auxiliary  establishments,  since it is there that 
top managers and administrators  and many R&D personnel are employed. 
Since the number of these (relatively  highly—paid)  workers is small 
compared to the number in production  establishments,  the effects of 
ownership change  on them have not been captured or have been heavily 
masked in previous studies of the labor impact  of takeovers. 
One of our major findings is that employment growth  is much lower -- 
17 percentage  points lower  over 5 years  in auxiliary establishments 
changing owners  than in those not changing  owners.  Mean employment 27 
growth is slightly  positive for establishments  not changing  owners,  arid 
is sharply negative for establishments  changing  owners.  There is, 
however, no significant  difference  between changers  and nonchangers  in 
the growth  of R&D employment. 
The increase in payroll  per employee  was 9 percentage  points lower 
among auxiliary  establishments  changing owners  than it was among other 
auxiliary establishments,  controlling  for industry  and the initial wage 
rate,  The relative  decline in total compensation (including  supplements 
to payroll)  was perhaps 1/3 higher, about 12 percentage  points. 
The relative declines  in employment  and wages of workers in auxilia- 
ry establishments  are about three times as great  as the corresponding 
declines in production  establishments.  (In the latter  case,  the data 
indicate  that the declines  occur immediately  before ownership change  and 
are to a small extent  reversed soon after.  Unfortunately,  due to the low 
frequency  of the auxiliary  establishment data,  we cannot  determine how 
much of the employment  and wage declines there  occurred  before vs.  after 
ownership change.)  This implies that ownership  change results in reduc- 
tions in the wage and especially  in the employment  of auxiliary-esta- 
blishment employees relative  to those of production-establishment 
employees.  Taken at face  value, it implies that the ratio of auxiliary- 
establishment  to production-establishment  employment  declines 11.2  percent 
in firms  involved  in ownership  change relative to firms  not so involved. 
This translates  into the elimination  of 7.2 auxiliary  establishment  jobs 
for every 1000  production  establishment jobs. 
Some people express concern about the number of lawyers, investment 
bankers, and other highly-paid  professionals  devoted to facilitating  or 28 
implnenting  takeovers,  and think thst this  may constitute  a waate of 
valuable human resources  But the quantity and quality of labor engaged 
in thia activity  may not be high relstive  to the quantity  and quality of 
central-office  labor  "saved"  as a consequence  of ownership  chsoge. 
Because we failed to account for auxiliary-establishment  employment 
in our earlier investigstion cf the effects of  ownership change on 
productivity, we may bsve underestimated  tbe productivity  gain associated 
with ownership change  by as much as 42 percent.  The underestimate  may 
not have been that great,  however, if the declines in employment  in 
auxiliary establishments  changing  owners  are partially  offset  by increas- 
es in employment  in other  auxiliary  establishments  owned  by acquiring 
firms.  There is no evidence  that this is the case in the economy as a 
whole,  but the data just for manufacturing (which  may be more reliable) 
are consistent  with the hypothesis  of partially-offsetting  employment 
increases in these  other establishments. An admittedly  crude attempt to 
adjust  for this reduces  from 16 to 11 percent the magnitude of the 
relative  auxiliary—establishment  employment  decline of firms  involved in 
ownership  change.  A  more refined analysis of this issue  is warranted, 
however. 
In addition to revealing important  differences  between the effects 
of ownership change  on auxiliary  and production establishments,  our 
analysis also indicated  clear (although  smaller)  differences  between its 
effects on production  and nonproduction  workers in production  establish- 
ments.  Only the production  employees in these  establishments  appear to 
experience  relative  employment  declines in connection  with changes in 
ownership.  Because  the relative employment  of nonproduction  employees in 
production establishments  doesn't decline,  the overall  ratio  of 29 
"indirect'  to "direct  labor  isn't reduced in the course  of ownership 
change.  But the composition  or locus of indirect labdr  does change 
significantly,  as the fraction  of it accounted  for by au.xiliary estab- 
lishments is reduced. 
The paper also provided some evidence concerning  the relationship 
between firm size and administrative-intensity,  defined  as the ratio of 
auxiliary-establishment  employment to total firm  employment.  Certain 
models of organizational  structure  imply that administrative-intensity 
should  be constant or even  declining with respect to firm size throughout 
most of the range of firm  size,  but our data reveal  an almost  strIctly 
increasing  relationship  throughout  the range.  Here,  too,  further  re- 
search is needed to illuminate  the nature of returns to scale  in 
administration. Note:  Number  of employees in thousands. 
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TABLE 1 
Distribution  of Auxiliary-Establishment Employees 
by Type  of Work  Performed, 
All Industries,  1982 
Number of  Percent of 
eoforkrformed  es  eml2ys 
Administrative and Managerial  906  35.3 
Office  and Clerical  663  25.8 
Research, Development,and  Testing  240  9.3 
Warehousing  268  10.4 
Electronic  Data Processing  134  5.2 
Direct Sales to Customers  73  6.1 
Other Activities  85  7.9 
Total  2570  100.0 31 
TABLE 2 
Employment  ad  Payroll of 
Auxiliary and  Production Establishments 
in  Manufacturing, 1963 -  1982 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Auiiiary Establisnments  Productioc.  Establishments 
Payroll  Payroll  (1)  'r  (4) 
Yea"  Lisp.  Payr"l_ppmP.  arOli5LEm.  (percent) 
1963  727  16232  93  5.7  4.5  1.68 
1967  831  9  10,8  18492  123  6.7  4.5  1.61 
1972  994  14  14.1  18034  16  8.9  5.5  1,58 
1977  1074  22  20 5  18516  242  13.1  5.8  1.57 
1982  1276  38  29.8  17818  341  19.1  7.2  1.56 
Note'  Employment in thousands. 
Payroll in billions of dollars. 
Payroll  per empioyee in  thousands of dollars. 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1982  Census of Manufactures, Subject Series MC82-S—1 (Part  1), 
General  Summary,  p.  1-98. TABLE  3 
Mean Values of Employment and Wage 
Levels and Changes, by Status 
of Auxiliary Establishment, 1977-82 
Status  N  anEloent  Mean change  WE  bean change 
2977  1982  in  in (emp.),  2:227_J  in  in (wage, 
1977—82  1977-82 
ALL  INDUSTRIES 
No  Change  16730  93.2  99.6  .031  17.6  26.8 
Changed 
Ownecs  2027  57.9  63.2  —158  14,7  22.1 
Closed  22184  34.0  15.7 
Opened  17219  ——  45.0 
NANUTACTL'RING 
No  Change  5390  156.3  174.3  .042  20.0  30.1  .398 
Changed 
Owners  633  93.2  101.0  —.120  18.6  26.8 
Closed  3437  52.5  ——  —-  17.6  —— 
Opened  4134  --  65.3  --  29.0 
Note:  Employment is number of  workers, 
Wage is payroll  per employee, in thousands of dollars, 33 
TABLE 4 
Estimated Effects of  Ownership Change on 
Employment and  Wage in 
Auxiliary and Production Establishments 
Type of  Effect of Ownership Change on: 
Establishment  Industry  Employment  N 
Auxiliary  All  —.167  - .092  12499 
(8.4)  (7.3) 
Auxiliary  Manufacturing  .157  - .060  5949 
(4.6)  (3,1) 
Production  Manufacturing 
- .045 
- .021  18586 
(5.4)  (4.7) 
Note:  Each of the effects reported above ia an estimate of  the 
coefficient  in a regression of the form 
lnX 
= 1 
+ 2  lOX_5 
+  ÷ 
where X denotes either employment or  the wage rate; the 
aubacript ijt refera to eatabliahment i in  industry  in 
year t; OC equala I if the establishment  changed owners 
between t — S  and t, and equals zero otherwise; y. ia a 
"fixed effect' for induatry j; and u ia a classicAl 
disturbance.  t is 1982 for auxiliary eatabliahmenta, 
and ia 1981  for production eatabliahmenta.  All equations 
included a complete set of 4-digit SIC industry duy 
variables.  Nuxsbera in  parentbeaea are t - statistics. 34 
TABLE 5 
Differences  in Mean Log Employment 
(Total,  Production,  and Nonproduction) 
in Year t+k between production establishments 
Changing and not changing owners 
between t-l and t 
Total  Production-  Nonproducti on- 
employment  worker  worker  p,jff) 
-.069  —.082  .012 
(3.68)  (4.24)  (1.95) 
—.072  —.086  .013 
(4,11)  (4.79)  (2.45) 
—.072  - .082  .010 
(4.41)  (4.95)  (1.97) 
t-2  -.103  -  116  .017 
(6.89)  (7.61)  (3.62) 
t-1  -.119  -.133  .012 
(8.03)  (8.81)  (2.61) 
—.132  —.153  .012 
(9.48)  (10.73)  (2.66) 
—.131  —.145  .012 
(8.67)  (9.33)  (2.39) 
-.120  -.131  .009 
(7.28)  (7.78)  (1.76) 
t+3  —.118  —.125  .011 
(6.72)  (6.69)  (1.88) 
t+4  -.124  —.126  .015 
(6.54)  (5.97)  (2.38) 35 
TABLE 6 
Ratio of Central-office Employment to 
Total Firm Employment  by  Size of Firm 
Proportion 
Ratio of  Ratio of  of  firms 
Mean  total central—  Administrative  owning at 
total  office employment  and managerial  least o'o 
firm  to  total firm  employment  to total  auxiliary 
Size  emploe.p  establishment 
Claas* 
Weighted  Unweighted  Weighted 
0  44  0.5%  5.0%  0.2%  5.2%  3% 
1  150  2.1  2.8  0.6  1.2 
2  284  44  4.7  1.5  1.6  23 
3  458  2.8  4.0  1.1  1.6  24 
4  666  3.8  4.4  1.5  1.6  34 
5  1029  6.5  6.6  2.0  2.3  50 
6  1670  6.0  7.5  2.2  2.6  60 
7  3147  7.1  8.5  2.9  3.1  69 
8  7317  10.0  10.4  3.6  3.7  84 
9  36163  11.3  11.1  3.8  3,8  91 
were ranked and grouped into 10 size classes on  the basis of total 
firm employment.  There are about 278 firma in  each size class. REFEkEN  CE  S 
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